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ABSTRACT 
 
Preference reversals (PRs) occur when one’s preferences over the same items 
change depending upon how one is asked to construct a preference. PRs are a 
robust phenomenon which lead to suboptimal real-world decision-making. Despite 
this, it remains unclear why PRs occur. This study investigated whether biological 
procedural invariance (i.e. different procedures are associated with different 
underlying mechanisms) could elucidate why PRs occur. Seventeen participants 
were scanned via fMRI whilst a) expressing preferences between two probabilistic 
wins or two probabilistic losses (one high and one low magnitude) and, b) reporting 
a monetary amount (valuation) according to how much they wanted to sell a 
potential winning gamble for or how much they would pay to forgo a potential loss. 
Participants’ valuations closely followed expected value. Choice behaviour, 
however, was more prone to bias due to unequal weighting of either magnitude or 
probability. Preference formation during both valuation and choice was associated 
with fronto-parietal neural activity. Within this system, valuation was associated 
with greater activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and caudal anterior cingulate 
cortex whilst choice was associated with greater activity in the insula, horizontal 
inferior parietal sulcus, posterior cingulate cortex and somatosensory cortex. The 
combination of behavioural and neuroimaging data may suggest that participants 
used a mathematical approach to formation of valuations but choices were subject 
to emotional influence. These findings may provide support for a biological 
procedural invariance view of gambling preference reversal. These findings are 
difficult to accommodate within explanations that rely on modifications to expected 
utility and prospect theory.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Preference reversals occur when one’s own preference for one particular item over 
another changes dependent upon how one is asked to provide the preference. For 
example, when providing a monetary valuation of two dinner sets in isolation, one 
containing 24 pieces in good condition (set L) and another containing  31 pieces in 
good condition and 9 pieces that are broken (set M), set L is typically ascribed a 
higher buying price. However, when both sets are shown in tandem and the 
individual is asked to choose between them, set M is typically preferred, thus 
indicating that preferences are unstable (Hsee, 1988). In the literature, the 
preference reversal (PR) phenomenon is observed when participants are 
presented with a pair of risky gambles matched for expected value, such that one 
gamble has a low payout and high win probability (referred to hereafter as the “P-
bet”), whilst the other has a higher payout value but lower probability (referred to as 
the “$-bet”). Under these conditions participants typically choose the high 
probability P-bet when asked to make a straight forward choice; but when asked to 
ascribe a monetary value to each bet the high payout $-bet typically receives a 
greater valuation (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Lindman, 1971; Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1968). The phenomenon has proved to be extremely robust and has 
been observed consistently across various contexts and conditions (Lichtenstein & 
Slovic, 2006; Thaler, 1988) including in a study with actual gamblers in a Las 
Vegas casino (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1973). However, despite the ease with which 
PRs can be elicited they have proven much harder to explain. Economists have 
frequently attempted to explain away the phenomenon as a form of artefact (Guala, 
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2000; Hausman, 1991) elicited by psychologists who “have the reputation for 
deceiving subjects” (Grether and Plot, 1979, p. 629). Gambling PRs are also of 
relevance to other aspects of everyday decision making. For example, PR-like 
phenomenon are often observed in health-related choices (Bleichrodt and Prades, 
2009; Oliver, 2006) and policy decisions (Amiel et al., 2005) which can lead to sub-
optimal choices involving distribution of one’s own income and attitude towards 
risky medical procedures dependent on how risk and reward is framed. 
 
In relation to economic theory, PRs constitute a violation of at least one of the key 
axioms of expected utility theory which proposes that for any given series of 
alternatives, humans will consistently choose the option with the highest value (or 
“utility”) according to a fixed equation. Utility theory explicitly assumes that 
preferences are independent (i.e. that the value attributed to an option is 
unaffected by the presentation of other options) and show procedural invariance 
such that equivalent procedures for assessing preference should yield the same 
choices. A number of authors have argued that PRs might be explained via minor 
modifications to aspects of the independence principle (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 
1983; Fishburn, 1985; Holt, 1986; Karni and Safra, 1987; Segal, 1988), whilst other 
authors have argued that the effect represents a contradiction of procedural 
invariance (Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987; Tversky et al., 1990). In a seminal paper 
examining a number of possible interpretations for PRs in the context of the 
expected utility framework, Tversky et al. (1990) found that 90% of PRs elicited 
were attributable to procedural invariance rather than violations of other principles 
of expected utility (including the so-called intransitivity principle, see Kalenscher et 
al., 2010). The authors also concluded that PRs commonly occurred due to relative 
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overpricing of high value bets when a monetary value had to be ascribed to the 
bet. A plausible psychological explanation of this effect is that attention is more 
directed to the monetary amount associated with a bet when participants have to 
consider its value. This “scale compatibility” hypothesis offers a mechanism via 
which preferences are impacted by the procedure used to elicit the preference. 
Never the less, economic theorists continue to negate the role of procedural 
invariance and endeavour to specify models of preference formation which posit a 
unified mechanism underlying human choice in both valuation and forced choice 
contexts (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2009; Butler and Loomes, 2007; Loomes, 2010).  
 
Functional brain imaging affords the opportunity to test whether these accounts of 
PRs are consistent with biological substrates underlying the valuation and forced 
choice procedures. Differences in brain activity between the two conditions would 
be consistent with a biological procedural invariance account in which the two 
modes activated segregated decision making system. The alternative is that the 
same areas are activated under both conditions, consistent with accounts which 
specify a single underlying mechanism for valuation and forced choice decisions. 
Previous neuroimaging studies have identified a system of brain regions involved 
in reward-related risky decision making involving the prefrontal, limbic and parietal 
regions. Within this system, there is a wealth of research that has elucidated the 
brain regions involved in stimulus valuation, notably the ventro-medial prefrontal 
cortex and ventral striatum (Cunningham et al., 2008; DeMartino et al., 2009; Elliott 
et al., 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Montague and Berns, 2002; Peters and 
Büchel., 2009), and action selection, particularly the lateral prefrontal cortex, 
parietal cortex and dorsal striatum (Balleine et al., 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 
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2009; Pesaran et al., 2008). Previous neuroimaging studies have also studied 
related framing effects in decision making. A reliably documented framing effect is 
an individual’s tendency to be risk-averse when indicating preferences between 
risky outcomes that are framed as potential gains but risk-seeking when the risks 
are framed as potential losses, despite values and probabilities in both frames 
being equal (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). De Martino et al. (2006) found that 
the amygdala was associated with choices to make decisions in accordance with 
the valence of the frame (risk-averse with rewards and risk-seeking with losses) 
compared to choices which ran counter to the frame, thus providing evidence for a 
mediating effect of emotion on this decision bias, a finding strengthened by other 
researchers investigating framing effects in risky situations (Roiser et al., 2009; 
Zheng et al., 2010) and social evaluations (Deppe et al., 2005). These findings 
naturally lead to the hypothesis that similar differences in emotional input during 
valuation and/or choice may account for the difference in behaviour between the 
two preference elicitation frames underlying PRs and that these should be reflected 
in the distribution of brain activity.  
 
The objective of this study was therefore to investigate whether brain activity as 
measured by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), differed during 
preference formation under the two frames of the classic PR experiment. The first 
hypothesis states that the two task types will recruit different brain systems and 
that activation of these systems within the two task types leads to the recruitment 
of separable cognitive processes and, therefore, PRs occur due to the different 
output of two separable systems. The second hypothesis states that the brain 
systems involved in each task type will be overlapping. In this case, PRs potentially 
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occur due to differential functioning of discrete parts of the same system between 
each elicitation procedure.  
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2. METHODS 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Seventeen right-handed participants took part in the study (M = 21.47 years, SD = 
3.53, Range = 18-29 years). Participants were recruited from student populations 
at the University of Bath and University of Exeter. There were fourteen females and 
three males. All participants were volunteers who were taking part as they were 
interested in the research or having experience of fMRI or being part of a research 
study. 
 
2.2. Experimental Tasks 
 
Participants completed four tasks in the scanner; a Reward Valuation Task (Val-
Rew), a Loss Valuation Task (Val-Loss), a Forced Choice reward task (Choice-
Rew) and a Forced Choice Loss task (Choice-Loss). The order of the tasks for 
each participant was decided randomly by a random number generator 
(www.random.org). All rewards and losses were hypothetical. All tasks were back-
projected onto a translucent screen located at the foot of the scanner bed, viewed 
through mirror mounted on the scanner head coil above the participant’s eye-line. 
 
2.2.1. Reward and loss valuation tasks 
 
Each trial presented a single, hypothetical gamble stating an amount of money to 
be won or lost according to a probability. Reward magnitude was either High 
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(£200) (i.e. the “$-bet”) or Low (£100) (the “P-bet”). These magnitudes were 
selected so that they would appear to be attainable and realistic potential 
wins/losses whilst the difference between them was large enough to be salient to 
our sample. Probabilities ranged from 0.1 to 1.0 in 0.1 intervals. A full list of 
gambles used in the tasks is included in Table 1.   
 
Participants were instructed to create a valuation of discrete gambles. In the Val-
Rew task participants were instructed to report a monetary amount corresponding 
to how much they would sell the gamble for. The instructions for the Val-Rew are 
shown below. 
In this task, you will see some uncertain gambles. Each gamble consists in an amount of money 
that could be won with a certain probability. E.g. 50% chance of winning £20. 
 
We just want you to watch each gamble and, while it is displayed, evaluate for yourself how much 
money you would want to sell the gamble for (i.e. its price).  There are no right or wrong answers, 
just how much you think the gamble is worth. It could be a large or small amount, so you should feel 
free to choose a price between £1 and £200.  After each gamble is presented, you will be able to 
indicate your preferred price using a sliding scale. 
 
Sometimes you will see displays in which the numbers of the gamble have been replaced by letters 
so that the gambles have no meaning; these are just control displays which help us to analyse the 
responses to the real gambles. Please watch the screen as normal during these displays and then 
provide a fixed price of £200. 
In the Val-Loss task participants were instructed to report a monetary amount 
corresponding to how much they would pay to ensure that the gamble (a potential 
loss) would not be played. Full instructions for the Val-Loss are shown below. 
In this task, you will see some uncertain gambles. Each gamble consists in an amount of money 
that could be lost with a certain probability. E.g. 50% chance of losing £20. 
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We just want you to watch each gamble and, while it is displayed, evaluate for yourself how much 
money you would pay to make sure that the gamble didn’t happen to you (i.e. its price).  There are 
no right or wrong answers, just how much you think the gamble is worth. It could be a large or small 
amount, so you should feel free to choose a price between £1 and £200.  After each gamble is 
presented, you will be able to indicate your preferred price using a sliding scale. 
 
Sometimes you will see displays in which the numbers of the gamble have been replaced by letters 
so that the gambles have no meaning; these are just control displays which help us to analyse the 
responses to the real gambles. Please watch the screen as normal during these displays and then 
provide a fixed price of £200 
 
A schematic of a valuation task trial is shown in Figure 1. After the gamble was 
shown, participants then reported their valuation on a measure similar to a visual 
analogue scale (VAS). At the apex of each line was a monetary amount (£1 on the 
left apex and £200 on the right apex). Participants moved a vertical bar left or right 
along the line to a region corresponding to their predetermined monetary valuation 
using left/right buttons on a two-button box. There were 20 possible positions in 
which the bar could be placed (i.e. moving in £10 intervals). The screen containing 
the gamble was presented for 5 seconds and the VAS presented for 7.5 seconds. 
An inter-trial interval (ITI) followed this consisting of a blank screen with a jittered 
duration between 3-12 seconds decided pseudo-randomly when the task was 
constructed. 
 
Control trials were presented in which the numbers associated with the gamble 
were replaced by letters (e.g. ‘£XXX’) so that no valuation could take place. During 
the rating of the control trials, participants were instructed to move the bar to £200 
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in every trial so that a motor movement was still performed. There were 12 control 
and 18 valuation trials in the Val-Rew with each gamble being presented once 
(apart from £200 at 50% chance which was presented twice). The task took nine 
minutes 54 seconds to complete excluding the time taken reading the instructions. 
There were 12 control trials and 13 valuation trials in the Val-Loss (for details of 
which gambles were presented see Table 1). The task took eight minutes 20 
seconds to complete excluding the time taken reading the instructions. The Val-
Loss was shorter so as to accommodate the scanning within a time period 
comfortable for the participant. 
 
2.2.2. Reward and Loss Forced-choice tasks 
 
The two forced-choice tasks presented gambles from the valuation tasks in two-
alternative, forced-choice, scenarios. The Choice-Rew and Choice-Loss 
consecutively presented two potentially winning or two potentially losing gambles 
respectively. The instructions are shown below. 
You will be presented with a series of choices involving two gambles. 
 
Select which gamble you prefer. 
 
There is no right or wrong answer. Just choose whichever you prefer. 
 
Use the blue button to choose the amount in the left of the screen and the yellow button to select 
the amount on the right 
 
After you have chosen, there may be a delay in which the choice remains on the screen. If this 
occurs do not make another response, just wait for the next choice. 
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Sometimes, the numbers in the choice will be replaced by letters, making it meaningless. In these 
cases, simply choose the gamble that is underlined. 
 
A visual depiction of the task can be seen in Figure 2. During choice trials, a 
screen was presented for 5 seconds containing two gambles presented in pairs 
with one on the left and one on the right of the screen. The location of the gambles 
was counterbalanced and decided pseudo-randomly when the task was 
constructed. One of the alternatives had a reward of £100 and the other, £200. The 
probability of each alternative varied on each trial such that there were trials where 
the £100 gamble had the highest expected value compared to the £200 gamble 
and vice-versa (see Table 2 for details of how the gambles were ordered). 
Participants indicated which one of the two alternatives they preferred by way of a 
left/right button press on a two-button box. The control stimuli were the same as in 
the valuation tasks but presented in pairs and the participant was instructed to 
choose either the leftmost or rightmost gamble. Participants had to make an equal 
number of leftmost and rightmost selections in control trials. There were 18 choice 
trials and 12 control trials. 
 
Following the choice screen, an ITI consisting of a blank screen with a centralised 
fixation point was shown for a jittered period of time (3-12 seconds) decided 
pseudo-randomly when the task was constructed. Following this, the next trial was 
presented. Each task took seven minutes and 36 seconds to complete excluding 
the time taken reading the instructions. 
 
2.3. Data Analysis 
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2.3.1. fMRI acquisition and preprocessing 
 
Blood oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) analysis was performed using a gradient-
echo T2* weighted sequence (Echo Planar Imaging) through a 1.5 Tesla Phillips 
Gyroscan Intera located at the Peninsula Magnetic Resonance Research Centre at 
the University of Exeter, U.K. A 30o tilted acquisition sequence was used in order 
to reduce signal dropout within the orbitofrontal lobes. The image parameters were 
as follows: TE 45ms; TR 3s; 38 slices; slice thickness 3mm; inter-slice gap 0mm; 
voxel size 3mm3; inter-scan interval 3s. The volumes present in the Val-Rew, Val-
Loss, Choice-Rew and Choice-Loss were 200, 170, 155 and 155 volumes 
respectively. Images were analysed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, London, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Pre-processing 
consisted of slice time correction, motion correction, coregistration of each 
individual participant’s mean resliced image to their T1-weighted structural image, 
segmentation, normalisation to the mean coregistered image and smoothing of the 
functional data using a FWHM 8mm kernel. A high-pass filter was applied to all 
images (128s) and autocorrelation of the hemodynamic response function was 
modelled as an AR(1) process. In the first level, movement parameters were 
entered as a regressor of no interest. 
 
 
2.3.2 fMRI analysis 
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The fMRI statistical model assessed activations during the decision periods in the 
valuation or choice tasks corresponding to the period between the onset and offset 
of the presentation of the gamble or gamble pair (including control trials), modelled 
as discrete events with five seconds duration. 
 
In the first level of analysis, statistical contrasts were created which compared the 
BOLD response to experimental events to their respective control events. In the 
valuation tasks this corresponded to the contrast gamble minus control trial, 
henceforth known as the “valuation period” activity and in the forced-choice tasks 
this corresponded to the choice minus control trial contrast, henceforth known as 
the “choice period”. Random effects analyses were performed by pooling these 
contrast images for each subject in a second level group analysis to assess 
consistent patterns of activity across participants.  
 
The main objective of the study was to contrast activity during processing of 
valuations vs. making a forced choice. Thus, at the second level the output from 
the first level contrast from each task, i.e. valuation period and choice period, were 
directly contrasted. This produced two main contrasts for each reward type 
(valuation-choice under potential gain and valuation-choice for potential losses). 
Secondary to the main objective, we were interested in investigating whether the 
neural substrates related to the processing of valuation and choice separately was 
different when faced with rewards vs. losses. To explore overall effects of rewards 
vs. losses activity from both tasks involving rewards (valuation and choice) was 
compared to that within both tasks involving losses in factorial design. To 
investigate whether there were any differences within each task type, repeated 
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measures t-tests were used to compare BOLD signal derived from the first-level 
analyses within the reward valuation and, separately, within the choice tasks. 
 
All co-ordinates shown are in Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) 
transformed from MNI space using Talairach Daemon (www.talairach.org) utilising 
a nearest gray matter search. This transformation method is in wide use within 
cognitive neuroscience research. For the reason that we did not specify any 
hypotheses concerning the loci of differential brain function, a cluster-wise analysis 
approach was taken whereby all voxels met a threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected) 
and met a cluster threshold of p < .05 (uncorrected). 
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3. RESULTS 
 
3.1. Behavioural data 
 
The mean valuations given by the participants in the Val-Rew and Val-Loss are 
shown in Figure 3. These graphs indicate that participant’s valuations were 
generally close to expected value.  
 
The number of all categories of participants combined choices and valuations of 
gambles are also shown in Figure 3. Previous work has shown that “standard” PRs 
where the P-bet is chosen over the $-bet but the $-bet receives a greater valuation, 
are more common than “non-standard” preference reversals, where the $-bet is 
chosen over the P-bet but the P-bet receives a greater valuation. Our results 
confirmed this finding with a significantly greater number of standard relative non-
standard PRs, χ2 = 77.87, p < .001. Out of 222 choices for the P-bet 52.3% 
constituted PRs relative to the valuation condition (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, 
1973) whilst only 22.4% of the 67 choices recorded for $-bets were PRs.  
 
In the loss valuation (loss-val) condition participants had to indicate an amount they 
would be prepared to pay to forgo the potential loss whilst in the Choice-Loss 
condition they had to indicate the gamble they would prefer to pay i.e. the gamble 
which to them represented the lesser of the two losses. Thus standard PRs in this 
case would be choices for the low probability $-bet in the context of a higher 
valuation being attributed to the $-bet. Consistent with this, such a pattern was 
observed much more frequently than the occurrence of choices for P-bet which 
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were attributed higher values than the accompanying $-bet. The frequency of 
instances of PRs (37% of all trials) was much greater than instances of non-
standard PRs (6.5%), χ2 = 184.18, p < .0001 (Figure 3).  
 
In summary the behavioural data replicates the original gambling PR phenomena 
as well as demonstrating reliable PRs for gambles representing uncertain losses. 
 
3.2. FMRI Results 
 
3.2.1. Overlapping activity during the choice and valuation tasks 
 
A conjunction analysis assessed regions which activated consistently across all 
conditions by combining 1 sample t-tests for each task (Val-Rew, Val-Loss, 
Choice-Rew and Choice-Loss). This showed overlapping activity within brain 
regions including bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and dorsomedial 
frontal cortex, anterior mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC), bilateral inferior parietal cortex 
(iPC, BA40), bilateral precuneus, angular cortex and premotor cortex; Figure 4 
shows the extent of overlapping regions within cortical areas from each task. 
 
3.2.2. Difference in brain activity during the choice and valuation tasks 
 
Direct statistical contrasts (repeated measures t-tests) between the two valuation 
(Val-Rew and Val-Loss) and two choice condition (Choice-Rew and Choice-Loss) 
were also carried out. This showed that some brain regions were more active in 
one task type versus the other (Figure 5). More specifically, the valuation minus 
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choice contrast yielded significant clusters within the left dlPFC (BA46), left 
supplementary motor area and the posterior midcingulate cortex (BA32). The 
choice minus valuation contrast yielded a greater number of significant clusters 
compared to the reverse contrast including a large cluster (349 voxels) within the 
left posterior insula in addition to the bilateral iPC (BA40), posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC) and a region of the posterior midcingulate cortex that was caudal to the 
region from the earlier contrast (BA24). Other regions included the bilateral 
superior temporal cortex, supramarginal cortex, primary motor and somatosensory 
cortex.  
 
Following from the main contrasts described above, the valuation and choice tasks 
were further split by gamble type (Reward / loss) to yield the following t-contrast 
images: Val-Rew vs. Choice-Rew and Val-Loss vs. Choice-Loss. The [(Val-Rew)-
(Choice-Rew)] contrast yielded significant clusters of activity within the left dlPFC, 
medial frontal cortex (BA6), aMCC and bilateral supplementary motor cortex. The 
[(Choice-Rew)-(Val-Rew)] contrast produced significant clusters within the right 
iPC, medial frontal cortex (BA6), somatosensory cortex and posterior cingulate 
cortex. The [(Val-Loss)-(Choice-Loss)] contrast yielded only one significant cluster 
within the dlPFC while the reverse contrast, [(Choice-Loss)-(Val-Loss)], yielded 
significant clusters within the right iPC, left premotor and somatosensory cortex 
and the bilateral (predominantly left) insula. 
 
To investigate potential differences in brain activity associated with reward type, 
each task type was compared across reward conditions to give the following 
contrasts; Val-Rew vs. Val-Loss and Choice-Rew vs. Choice-Loss. None of the 
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four contrasts produced any significant voxels. Furthermore, the overall effect of 
reward type was investigated by the following contrast, [(Val-Rew+Choice-Rew) vs. 
(Val-Loss+Choice-Loss)]. There were no significant clusters showing heightened 
activity in either reward type. 
 
3.2.3 Parametric Analyses 
 
In addition to the contrasts by task and gamble type described above we also 
assessed evidence for activity dependent upon the value of the difference in 
expected gamble in the choice tasks as well as the expected value of the chosen 
value in the choice task and the participants valuation and expected value of the 
gambles in the valuation task. None of these parametric analyses revealed any 
significantly activated voxels at the random effects level using the same statistical 
threshold used in the condition / task comparison analysis described above. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
Preference reversals (PRs) are a well known phenomenon in human decision-
making which have been the subject of extensive discussion by economists, 
psychologists and philosophers (Guala, 2000; Hausman, 1991; Grether and Plot, 
1979), due to the fact that they appear to constitute a violation of expected utility 
theory. Key to this debate is whether PRs reflect a violation of procedural 
invariance or can be explained by the application of a single preference formation 
mechanism across contexts. The present study integrated data derived from 
neurobiological and behavioural performance in order to explore differences in 
neural processing underlying preference formation during valuation and forced 
choice preference elicitation condition. Contrasting BOLD responses while 
participants made either a forced choice between gambles or attributed a monetary 
valuation to a gamble revealed an overlap between brain areas recruited by the 
two tasks. However, there were also large differences in the extent and location of 
brain activity observed under valuation and forced choice conditions. The 
difference in brain activations between the two tasks potentially points towards 
biological procedural invariance between the two frames, a hypothesis that will be 
discussed shortly. 
 
Consistent with previous findings standard PRs, where the P-bet is chosen over 
the $-bet for gains but the $-bet is given a higher value were significantly more 
common than the reverse pattern of preferences (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, 
1973; Lindman, 1971; MacDonald et al, 1992). In contrast, for losses choice of a 
gamble which a previously received the higher valuation in the valuation task 
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constitutes a PR and the classic PR phenomenon would be expected to be 
manifest as a choice for the high value / low probability £-bet alongside a lower 
valuation attributed to the P-bet. Consistent with this, choice of the £-bet combined 
with a higher valuation for the £-bet pattern was observed significantly more 
commonly than the opposite direction of PR in the present study. Under Loss 
conditions there was also a trend for more standard PRs to occur as the difference 
in expected utility (δEV) became positive (δEV was calculated as EV of $-bet – EV 
of P-bet, see Table 2). This behavioural trend violates assumptions put forward by 
expected utility theory, but does follow assumptions underlying prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) which states that humans are typically more risk-
seeking in a loss domain so as to try to evade the negative emotional arousal 
experienced following a loss (Tom et al. 2007).  
 
The fMRI findings indicated that both preference procedures were associated with 
an overlapping system of brain areas which included regions previously linked with 
value construction (Kim et al., 2009; McCoy & Platt, 20051; Rangel et al., 2008). 
The dlPFC and iPC have been reliably implicated in working memory and 
computational processing (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Dehaene, 2009), whilst both the 
dlPFC and aMCC are known to exert a modulatory role on the brains reward 
system, influencing activity in downstream regions within the basal ganglia (Haber 
& Knutson, 2009). In particular, dlPFC has been implicated in maintaining 
representations of outcomes in working memory (Miller & Cohen, 2011) whereas 
the aMCC has been reliably implicated in conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004; 
Botvinick, 2007). Activity in the dLPFC and aMCC may work together in a 
complementary manner in order to process and compare valuations of items held 
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within working memory in order to select the optimal outcome (Haber & Knutson, 
2009). In a review by Seitz et al. (2009), the medial frontal cortex was posited to 
process the valuation of items in an self-referential framework in line with findings 
suggesting that this region indexes the subjective mental concept of one’s own self 
(Passingham et al., 2010) and may thus reflect ego-centric valuation of the 
gambles. The posterior cingulate cortex is involved in risk-processing and its 
potential role during valuation will be returned to in greater detail. The premotor 
cortex has been found to be sensitive to relative values of items when a motor 
response is required to obtain an outcome (Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; Pastor-Bernier 
& Cisek, 2011) and that activity within the premotor cortex preceding a planned 
motor response correlates with the salience of a potential reward, i.e. that motor 
movements towards aversive outcomes are suppressed (Bianchin & Angrilli, 2011), 
likely reflecting the end-product of the processing of the reward system. The 
angular gyrus has been traditionally associated with comprehension and 
production of language (Price, 2010) although it has also been associated with 
exact, rather than approximate, mathematical calculation (Jost et al., 2011; 
Stanescu-Cosson et al., 2000). Activity in this study may reflect such computational 
processing given that all gambles were well-defined thus exact calculation of a 
value was possible. Additionally, the angular cortex has been linked to a neural 
system involved in experience of regret associated with efforts to avoid aversive 
outcomes (Chandrasekhar et al., 2008) and activity within this region may reflect 
negative feelings associated with perceived experience of loss during valuation of 
both potential gains and potential losses.  
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When contrasting the two elicitation procedures it was found that there were 
differences in the magnitude of BOLD response in particular regions within this 
network with the valuation conditions being associated with greater activity in 
lateral and dorso-medial frontal regions and forced choice being associated with 
increased activity within lateral and medial posterior regions and the insula. The 
specific regions activated also offer clues as to the different cognitive and decision 
making processes recruited under the forced choice and valuation conditions and 
may offer support for procedural invariance accounts of PRs when combined with 
the findings of the behavioural data. Behavioural data indicated that participants’ 
valuations followed very closely those calculated by expected utility theory. In 
contrast, participants did not express such “rational” behaviour in the forced choice 
task as evidenced by the frequency of PRs. This finding integrates well with the 
neurobiological results. Valuation was associated with increased activity in regions 
reliably implicated in “rational”, cognitive, processing, namely the lateral prefrontal 
cortex and caudal anterior cingulate cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Vogt et al., 
2003). In contrast, fMRI findings suggest that the forced choice was associated 
with activity in neural regions that have been robustly associated with emotion 
processing, i.e. posterior cingulate and insula. Neurophysiological studies in 
monkeys performing eye-movement decision-making studies have found that the 
posterior cingulate cortex is responsive to both reward magnitude and probability 
and appears to have an evaluative role in determining whether rewards 
experienced following a particular action match expectations (McCoy & Platt, 
20051). In humans, the posterior cingulate cortex has also been implicated in 
modulating individual attitudes towards risk (Engelmann and Tamir, 2009; Watson, 
2008). The insula has a well-documented role in processing experience of negative 
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emotions (Calder et al., 2001; Sanfey et al., 2003) and has been implicated in 
decision-making, specifically the precise coding of risk probabilities (Clark et al., 
2008; Quartz, 2009). It has been suggested that the insula encodes the level of 
aversion associated with experience of risky outcomes (Mohr et al, 2010) which 
would concur with our findings that insula activity was more prevalent in the loss 
domain as these choices would involve more negative emotion (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  
 
Other work has suggested the existence of interactions between the posterior 
cingulate and insula underlying the integration of emotional states in decision-
making (Quartz, 2009). In a recent paper, neural signatures of transitivity (another 
violation of expected utility theory) were explored by presenting participants with 
forced choices between two gambles with varying magnitudes and well-defined 
risks. Interestingly, the interplay in the interaction between posterior cingulate 
cortex and insula was critical in coding subjective, context-dependent and local 
value of each choice (Kalenscher et al., 2010). The authors posited that the 
posterior cingulate cortex indexed an individual’s response to risk while the insula 
indexed the urge to seek high rewards in line with findings indicating that insula 
activity correlates with excitement associated with high rewards during gambling (Li 
et al., 2009) i.e. low aversion to the risky outcome. 
 
Although the finding of conjoint increased posterior cingulate and insula activity in 
the choice vs. valuation tasks may suggest heightened influence of emotion within 
the choice task, it is important to note that these regions have also been 
associated with other roles. The insula has commonly been associated with 
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emotional processing, but also with gustation, olfaction, processing of pain, 
switching, inhibition and response conflict (Chang et al., 2012; Menon and Uddin, 
2012). The posterior cingulate cortex, in addition to being involved in emotion and 
reward processing, also has a role in sensory processing (Vogt et al., 1992; Vogt et 
al., 2003). Furthermore, it is perhaps not surprising that the two tasks are 
associated with somewhat different patterns of activation given that in one task the 
participant must map their valuations to a scale while in the other a choice must be 
formed. This study did not seek to suggest otherwise. Instead, it aimed to explore 
what were the processes underlying preference formation in the two tasks and how 
they differed, thus attempting to elucidate why PRs occur at all. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first neuroimaging study directly comparing the two tasks 
commonly used in the economic and psychological literature investigating PRs. 
The use of fMRI permitted the investigation of processes underlying the two tasks, 
thus providing ideas as to the potential reasons why PRs occur. Although other 
processes may be at play, the “rational vs. emotional” argument is strengthened by 
our behavioural findings, which showed that valuations very closely followed those 
calculated by expected value in contrast to the forced choice task where PRs (non-
rational behaviour) were common. This study can be seen as a foundation from 
which to build future studies as targets for future research have been identified. 
Future work may wish to further explore the role of the posterior cingulate cortex 
and insula in decision-making and valuation with particular attention on how the 
interaction between these regions may lead to biases in choice behaviour. 
 
Other brain regions also showing increased activity for the forced choice relative to 
the valuation procedure included the supplementary motor area, caudal anterior 
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cingulate cortex (both involved in response selection) and the iPC. The difference 
in BOLD response measured within the iPC was predominantly localised to the 
horizontal inferior parietal sulcus (HIPS), which has repeatedly been associated 
with arithmetical processing (Dehaene et al. 1998; Dehaene et al. 2004; Dehaene, 
2009; Riviera et al. 2005) as well as being associated with reward processing (Liu 
et al., 2011). One explanation for enhanced activity in this region would be that 
there was an increased mathematical processing in the choice tasks over the 
valuation tasks as there are two gambles to process instead of one. However, this 
infers that the worth of the gambles in the choice frame was calculated 
mathematically. As has been concluded by our behavioural and fMRI results, the 
gambles during the choice frame were not treated in such an arithmetical manner. 
Alternatively parietal regions may be recruited by processing of ambiguous 
rewards. The iPC has been reliably associated with the processing of risky rewards 
(Bach et al., 2009; Vickery and Jiang, 2009) and has a role in representing the 
probability and / or reward magnitude of risky gambles (McCoy and Platt, 2005; 
Platt and Glimcher, 1999).  
 
Within each type of elicitation procedure there was no significant difference in 
activity between gain and loss tasks suggesting that within each elicitation 
procedure the same processes occurred for constructing preferences between 
rewards and losses. This concurs with other literature showing that valuation of 
gains and losses are processed by similar neural regions (Breiter et al., 2001; 
Fitzgerald et al., 2009).  
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Our fMRI findings, supported by our behavioural findings, can be used to suggest 
that valuation is associated with dominance in “rational”, cognitive processing while 
forced choice is subject to contextual, affective, influence. This conclusion would 
therefore support Tversky et al.’s (1990) conclusion that procedural invariance is 
the driving force behind PRs, specifically the framing of the elicitation method is 
associated with formation of preferences using either a predominantly cognitive or 
emotional framework as evidenced by differential neural activity between elicitation 
methods.  This has potential implications for usage of the evaluation and choice 
tasks in psychology and economic research in addition to real-world choices. 
Negative emotions such as anxiety, depression, disgust and fear have been found 
to significantly impact upon decision-making involving risks (de Visser et al., 2010; 
Heilman et al., 2010; Miu et al., 2008; Smoski et al., 2008). Our results could 
suggest that the frame of the preference elicitation method is important in 
motivating discrete types of preference formation strategies. Therefore, with 
situations associated with heightened emotion, for example, health-related 
decisions, it may be better to frame the scenario in such a way as to elicit a 
cognitive, analytical, framework. It would be of interest to investigate whether 
training individuals to manage emotion or be mindful of negative emotions during 
risk-related decision making would lead to a decrease in incidences of PRs. 
 
One potential limitation was the absence of a transaction phase which has become 
common in economic and neuroeconomic literature using paradigms in which 
participants ascribing monetary amounts according to their willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) or willingness-to-sell (WTS) an item (DeMartino et al., 2009; Kahneman et 
al., 1990). During the transaction period the participant is offered a sum of money 
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(often randomly generated) and dependent on their WTP/WTS values, are given 
the money or keep the item. Such phases are designed with the aim of motivating 
the participant to provide their true WTP/WTP values. In our tasks, a transaction 
phase was not included in order to maximise the number of events measured 
within the scanner and allow time for investigation of preference of both gains and 
losses. We cannot say for certain whether the inclusion of a transaction phase 
would have elicited different preferences although future experiments may require 
the inclusion of a transaction phase. 
 
We have elucidated differences, and similarities, between the neural and cognitive 
processes underlying preference formation in evaluative and forced choice frames. 
This work could potentially have effects on such domains as business, banking, 
marketing, healthcare or other such industry in which choice between uncertain 
options play an important role. Care needs to be taken to frame problem 
information situations such that consumers/decision-makers approach the 
formation of their preferences either in a rational, “cold”, framework or an 
emotional, “hot”, framework. 
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Figure 1. Schematic of single Valuation task (Val-Rew) trial. Shown is an example 
of a valuation trial and a control trial. Following a valuation trial the participant 
indicated their valuation on a visual analogue scale which ranged from £1 to £200 
in £10 intervals. So that the participant made a motor movement in the control 
trials, they were instructed to move the slider to £200. 
Figure 2. Schematic of a Forced choice task (Choice-Rew) trial. A forced-choice 
and control trial are shown. In the forced-choice trial participants made a choice 
between two alternatives. So that the participants also made a motor response in 
the control trials they were instructed to press the button corresponding to the 
“alternative” that was underlined. 
Figure 3. Mean valuations from the Val-Rew and Val-Loss (upper panels). True 
expected value is indicated by the dotted lines and mean subject valuations by the 
solid line. Error bars show 2 standard errors from the mean. The distribution of 
preference reversals and choices relative to valuations from the Choice-Rew and 
Choice-Loss are also shown (lower panel bar plots) plotted against difference in 
expected value between the P-bet and $-bet for each gamble pair. The area of the 
bar labelled “Other” includes instances where valuations of the two were equal. 
Figure 4. Multislice overlay image of activity displayed on standard T1 MRI 
template showing activity  the Val-Rew (red), Val-Loss (blue), Choice-Rew (green) 
and Choice-Loss (yellow) conditions. The lateral and medial frontal regions were 
consistently activated during the valuation of gamble (gamble minus control trial 
contrast). For forced choice conditions additional activity is seen in the posterior 
parietal cortices and anterior cingulate (threshold, p<.001, cluster threshold, 
p<.05). 
 
Figure 5. Areas of increased activity revealed by the contrast of valuation vs. 
choice tasks (red regions) and choice tasks vs. the valuations tasks (blue regions) 
independent of gamble type (reward / loss) (threshold, p<.001, cluster threshold, 
p<.05).  
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